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RIGHT TO COUNSEL

no action that 'circumvents and thereby dilutes' the protection
afforded by the right to counsel." 1939
It appears that the Federal courts and the New York Court of
Appeals are in harmony on this issue. The right to counsel
protected by the Federal and New York State Constitutions is
violated when a government informant (without determining
whether the defendant was represented by an attorney) actively
engages a defendant in conversation which is likely to elicit
incriminating statements about the defendant's upcoming trial.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Caviano 1940
(decided June 17, 1993)
The defendant, Sean Caviano, appealed his conviction of
attempted murder in the second degree, and robbery in the first
degree, on the ground that his constitutional 194 1 right to
counsel1 942 was violated when he was questioned by New York
City detectives without an attorney being present. In affirming
the lower court's decision, the appellate division disagreed with
defendant's contentions, and held that his right to counsel was
not violated, due to the voluntariness of his statement and his
1943
failure to invoke his right to counsel.
1939. Id.
1940. 194 A.D.2d 429, 599 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1st Dep't 1993).

1941. The court, in rendering the decision, did not specify whether the "right
to counsel" referred to federal or state constitutions. The case, however, was
decided solely under the auspices of New York State case law.
1942. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section 6 provides in pertinent part: "In any
trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and
defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions. . .

."Id;

U.S. CONST.

amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall.., have the assistance of counsel for his
defense." Id.
1943. 194 A.D.2d at 430, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
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The defendant was on active duty in the Navy at the time of the
murder investigation, and was therefore questioned by New York
City detectives in Illinois. 1944 Testimony at the lower court level
indicated that the "defendant voluntarily agreed to be
interviewed, was fully advised of his Miranda rights, freely and
voluntarily gave his statement to the detectives, never invoked his
right to counsel, and did not request a telephone call ... prior to
the completion of the interview." 1945 Furthermore, the interview

was interrupted by periodic breaks, was not excessively lengthy,
included refreshment, and was characterized by the defendant
remaining calm and relaxed throughout. 1946 Such conditions pale
in comparison to those described in People v. Cooper.1947 In that
case, defendants confession was suppressed as a result of twelve
hours of continuous interrogation whereby defendant was
deprived of both sleep and dialysis. 1948
In Caviano, however, the defendant maintained that the alleged
violation of his right to counsel required that his statements be
suppressed. 1949 He relied on the New York Court of Appeals
decision in People v. Harris1950 which held that "statements
1944. Id.
1945. Id.
1946. Id. The court determined that the defendant had not been subjected to a
custodial interrogation. See People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234, 240, 500 N.E.2d
861, 864, 508 N.Y.S.2d 163, 166 (1986). In Hicks, the court determined that
defendant "could not reasonably have believe he was under arrest" when he
was not handcuffed, was permitted to park his own car, and was detained only
briefly. Id.; People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 591, 256 N.E.2d 172, 175, 307
N.Y.S.2d 857, 862 (1969). In Yukl, the defendant voluntarily came to the
police station, voluntarily answered questions and voluntarily gave up his
clothing, thus he could not be said to be in custody. Id.; see also People v.
Claudio, 85 A.D.2d 245, 447 N.Y.S.2d 972 (2d Dep't 1982) (questioning
occurring in defendant's home in presence of his family was not custodial and
any statements made were therefore admissible).
1947. 101 A.D.2d 1, 175 N.Y.S.2d 660 (4th Dep't 1984).
1948. Id. at 14-15, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 669-70.
1949. Id. at 14, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 669.
1950. 72 N.Y.2d 614, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1, rev'd on other
grounds, 495 U.S. 14 (1991). In Harris, police, without obtaining a warrant,
entered defendant's home and elicited oral, as well as written, confessions,
implicating defendant in the murder of his girlfriend. 72 N.Y.2d at 617, 532
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obtained from an accused following an arrest made in violation of
Payton195 1 ... are not admissible under the State Constitution if
they are a product of the illegality." 1952 The court reasoned that
in addition to defendant's concession that the rule in Payton,
prohibiting warrantless and nonconsensual entries was not
violated, neither the holding in Harrisnor its rationale applied to
the case at bar. 1953 The court held that such misplaced reliance

did not warrant suppression of defendant's
statements. 1954

incriminating

The federal case law indicates that an individual's right to
counsel attaches when formal proceedings have been initiated
against a defendant. 1955 In Moran v. Burbine,1956 a defendant

having no knowledge that his sister had retained counsel for him
N.E.2d at 1230, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 2. The court held the subsequent arrest

illegal, and ordered all confessions suppressed. Id. at 623, 532 N.E.2d at
1234, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
1951. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In Payton, the Supreme

Court held that warrantless, nonconsensual entries into a suspect's home for
the purposes of securing an arrest violates the Fourth Amendment. Therefore,
any evidence gained as a consequence of these illegal entries must be
suppressed. Id. at 589-90.
1952. Caviano, 194 A.D.2d at 430, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 253 (quoting Harris,77
N.Y.2d at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706). The "illegality" in
this statement refers to warrantless and nonconsensual entries into a suspect's
home by police. Caviano, 194 A.D.2d at 430, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
1953. Id. at 431, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
1954. Id. at 430-31, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 253. Payton addressed the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against warrantless and nonconsensual entries into a
suspect's home during an arrest. The defendant in the case at bar conceded that
no such violation of Payton occurred. Id. Therefore, neither Payton nor
Harris,which reiterates the importance of Payton in New York, is applicable
to the case at hand. Id.
1955. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986) ("mhe defendant
has the right to the presence of an attorney during an interrogation occurring
after the first formal charging proceeding .... "); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 398 (1977) ("[A] person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after
the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. .. .);
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). In Kirby, the court described the
initiation of adversarial, judicial proceedings as "formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Id.
1956. 475 U.S. 412 (1986)
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on a breaking and entering charge, signed written admissions
after being interrogated on suspicion of murder. 1957 The United
States Supreme Court refused to suppress these statements since
no formal murder charges had been initiated against the
defendant.

19 5 8

If the Moran Court could not find that formal

proceedings had begun, then applying federal law to the instant
case, defendant in Caviano could not sustain a claim that formal
proceedings had been initiated where he was only questioned on

the alleged violation. Therefore, defendant's statements were
clearly not protected under either the Federal or State
Constitutions.

CRIMINAL DIVISION
BRONX COUNTY
People v. Rivera1 9 5 9
(decided November 22, 1993)

Defendant, Ernesto Rivera, in a "hybrid form of
representation" 1960 attempted to proceed pro se and have his
criminal indictment dismissed, based on New York's speedy trial
provision. 1961 The court had to determine under what

1957. Id. at 417.
1958. Id. at 430-3 1.
1959. _ Misc. 2d _, 605 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1993).
1960. Id. at _,
605 N.Y.S.2d at 822. Hybrid representation occurs where a
defendant proceeds pro se and also receives standby counsel. Id. at _,
605

N.Y.S.2d at 823.
1961. Id. at
, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 822; see also N.Y. GRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 30.30 (McKinney 1992). This section states in part:
1. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision three, a motion made
pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section 170.30 or
paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted
where the people are not ready for trial within:
(a) six months of the commencement of a criminal action
wherein a defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at
least one of which is a felony;
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